What explains the low profitability of Chinese banks? by García Herrero, Alicia et al.
WHAT EXPLAINS THE LOW 
PROFITABILITY OF CHINESE BANKS?
Alicia García-Herrero, Sergio Gavilá 
and Daniel Santabárbara
Documentos de Trabajo 
N.º 0910
2009
WHAT EXPLAINS THE LOW PROFITABILITY OF CHINESE BANKS? 
 WHAT EXPLAINS THE LOW PROFITABILITY OF CHINESE BANKS? (*) 
Alicia García-Herrero (**) 
BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA 
Sergio Gavilá and Daniel Santabárbara (**) 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 
 
 (*)  The opinions expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Banco de España or Banco Bilbao
Vizcaya Argentaria. We would like to thank Maitena Duce and Pablo García-Luna for their excellent assistance with some 
of the data. We also thank José Manuel Montero, Daniel Navia, Jesús Saurina and Francisco Vázquez and three 
anonymous referees for their comments. All remaining errors are obviously ours. 
(**)  Corresponding authors. E-mail addresses: alicia.garcia-herrero@bbva.com.hk; daniel.santabarbara@bde.es. 
 
 
Documentos de Trabajo. N.º 0910 
2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Working Paper Series seeks to disseminate original research in economics and finance. All papers 
have been anonymously refereed. By publishing these papers, the Banco de España aims to contribute 
to economic analysis and, in particular, to knowledge of the Spanish economy and its international 
environment. 
 
The opinions and analyses in the Working Paper Series are the responsibility of the authors and, 
therefore, do not necessarily coincide with those of the Banco de España or the Eurosystem. 
 
 
The Banco de España disseminates its main reports and most of its publications via the INTERNET at the 
following website: http://www.bde.es. 
 
 
 
Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that the source is 
acknowledged. 
 
© BANCO DE ESPAÑA, Madrid, 2009 
 
ISSN: 0213-2710 (print) 
ISSN: 1579-8666 (on line) 
Depósito legal: M. 26157-2009   
Unidad de Publicaciones, Banco de España
Abstract 
This paper analyzes empirically what explains the low profitability of Chinese banks for the 
period 1997-2004. We find that better capitalized banks tend to be more profitable. 
The same is true for banks with a relatively larger share of deposits and for more X-efficient 
banks. In addition, a less concentrated banking system increases bank profitability, which 
basically reflects that the four state-owned commercial banks – China’s largest banks – have 
been the main drag for system’s profitability. We find the same negative influence for China’s 
development banks (so called Policy Banks), which are fully state-owned. Instead, more 
market oriented banks, such as joint-stock commercial banks, tend to be more profitable, 
which again points to the influence of government intervention in explaining bank 
performance in China. These findings should not come as a surprise for a banking system 
which has long been functioning as a mechanism for transferring huge savings to meet 
public policy goals. 
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1 Introduction 
There is, by now, overwhelming evidence that a well-functioning financial system is important 
for economic growth. Indeed, financial intermediation determines, among other factors, the 
efficient allocation of savings as well as the return of savings and investment. 
China’s banking sector is the most important component of the financial system 
(with 66% of total financial assets in 2006) and yet it has long remained undercapitalized and 
saddled with non performing loans (NPLs). Furthermore, bank capitalization, solvency 
and profitability are still below international standards. 
In 1997, the government started a comprehensive banking reform with the objective 
of transforming banks into market-functioning and profitable institutions. The reform has so 
far focused mainly on the restructuring of the largest banks, the 4 state-owned commercial 
banks (SOCBs), which had long served as lending arm of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
The restructuring has been conducted through capital injections and the carving out of 
NPLs.1 The rest of the banking system, with about 45% of total bank assets, has a much 
diversified structure. First, three state-owned development banks (so-called Policy Banks) are 
mainly in charge financing long-term projects, such as infrastructure. Second, thirteen partially 
private banks [so-called joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs)] are generally the most 
market-oriented and are, to a larger or lesser extent, privately owned. Third, over one hundred 
city commercial banks (CCBs), created by restructuring and consolidating urban credit 
cooperatives, generally operate at provincial level although some have grown much larger. 
Fourth, more than fifty Trust and Investment Corporations (TICs) intermediate foreign funds to 
finance local government companies and infrastructure and construction projects. While still 
relevant, their role and number has been fading over time and they have diversified away.  
Foreign participation in the Chinese banking system has two different forms: 
greenfield investment and acquisition of a minority share. The former is very small in terms of 
market size and scattered in over 200 foreign affiliates. For the latter, 27 Chinese commercial 
banks have foreign shareholders but always without control. Three of the 27 are actually 
SOCBs after having launched their IPOs in Hong Kong Stock Exchange and, in one case, 
also in that of Shanghai.2  
In parallel to the restructuring of the SOCBs, Chinese authorities are taking important 
steps to liberalize the banking system. This includes lifting the ceiling on lending rates and 
the floor on deposit rates, reducing the share of directed lending and slowly opening up the 
capital account.  
China’s bank reform is still ongoing so that it is hard to extract conclusions on how it 
may affect the functioning of the banking system. However, the success of the reform is so 
important for China’s economic development and, thereby, for the rest of the world, that it is 
worth analyzing. Furthermore, such conclusions, even if very tentative, might serve as useful 
suggestions on the direction and speed of the ongoing reform.  
                                                                          
1. Three of them have basically completed their restructuring while Agriculture Bank of China is still in progress. For more 
details on the reform, see García-Herrero, Gavilá and Santabárbara (2006). 
2. Chen, Li and Moshirian (2005) look into the effects of the first of these IPOs, that of Bank of China. 
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Among the different aspects of the banking system which could be analyzed, 
we focus on bank profitability. Healthy and sustainable profitability is vital in maintaining 
the stability of the banking system. Even if solvency is high, poor profitability weakens the 
capacity of a bank to absorb negative shocks, which will eventually affect solvency. 
In this vein, China’s transformation from a planned to a market economy implies that 
profitability will be increasingly relevant for Chinese banks. 
Profitability is a reflection of how banks are run given the environment in which 
banks operate. In fact, banks profitability should mirror the quality of their management 
and shareholders’ behaviour as well as their competitive strategies, efficiency and risk 
management capabilities.  
High profitability is good but also dangerous. In fact, high profitability could 
stem from strong market power and hamper the efficient intermediation of savings. In turn, 
low profitability might discourage private agents from conducting banking activities. As far as 
profitability considerations determine investors’ interest in financial institutions and, thus, 
the possibility to have enough capital to continue operating. Low profitability could also 
imply that only poorly-capitalized banks intermediate savings, with the corresponding costs 
for sustainable economic growth. Between these two extremes, Chinese banks lie closer 
to the latter. 
In this paper, we assess empirically which are the main factors behind the low 
profitability of Chinese banks. To that end, we use data for 87 banks, accounting for more 
than 80% of total assets, and for the longest relevant period: 1997 to 2004. Our results 
show that such low profitability is mainly explained by poor asset quality, low efficiency and 
scarce capitalization. We also find some evidence that concentration of assets in a few large 
state-owned banks and the scarcity of private-ownership hamper profitability.  
The paper is divided into seven sections. After this introduction, Section 2 reviews 
the existing literature on the determinants of bank profitability. Section 3 shows some stylized 
facts. Section 4 outlines the empirical methodology and Section 5 reports on the variables 
and data used. Section 6 presents the main results and Section 7 concludes. 
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2 Literature review in the Chinese context 
Given the importance of profitability for the good functioning of the banking system, the 
literature has devoted a lot of energy to understanding its main determinants. These can be 
classified in two groups of determinants: bank-specific (either intangible or tangible) and 
macroeconomic ones.  
Intangible bank-specific factors are as important as hard to account for. A good 
example is the quality of managerial decisions [Berger and Mester (1999)]. The quality of bank 
management is closely related to corporate governance [DeYoung and Rice (2004)]. 
China finds itself in a peculiar situation in terms of corporate governance, inherited from its 
transition to a market economy. In fact, Chinese banks are subject – to a larger or lesser 
extent – to massive government intervention. In many cases they are not free to choose their 
asset structure – as credit is directly or indirectly controlled by the central and/or the local 
governments – or to set interest rates. The quality of corporate governance is specially the 
case of SOCBs, whose lending is still directed to loss-making SOEs and local government 
projects. SOCBs, however, are the banks which Chinese trust most because of their implicit 
government guarantee. Weak corporate governance, therefore, results is low asset quality 
and high liquidity, hampering profitability.  
Among the different aspects of corporate governance, the property structure seems 
key for the Chinese case. In fact, the degree of government intervention is, to a large extent, 
reflected in the property structure. Government-owned banks, such as SOCBs and Policy 
Banks, are subject to more government intervention than banks with a larger share of private 
ownership (such as JSCBs and several CCBs). In addition, government-owned banks 
may have objectives different than profitability, such as social or regional development. 
The existing evidence generally confirms that state-owned institutions are less efficient and 
have poorer asset quality [La Porta et al. (2002), and Barth et al. (2004)]. For the specific case 
of China, several papers have shed some light on the effects of property structure. Yao and 
Jiang (2007) show that state-owned banks were 8-18% less efficient than non state-owned 
banks. Jia (2009) provides evidence that lending by SOCBs has been relatively riskier but 
more prudent over time. Lin and Zhang (2009) confirm that SOCBs are the worst performers 
(except the policy banks) in terms of simple measures of profitability, efficiency and asset 
quality. Ferri (2009), using a survey of 20 CCBs, finds that institutions located at the East and 
not controlled by SOEs tend to be associated with better asset quality and higher profitability. 
Foreign investors also tend to be less dependent on the government. In this vein, foreign 
banks are generally found to be more profitable than domestic banks in emerging countries 
[Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), and International Monetary Fund (2000)]. For the 
specific case of China, Berger et al. (2009) shows that foreign ownership and minor size have 
been associated with higher efficiency.  
We now move to reviewing more tangible bank-specific factors affecting profitability. 
A first one is bank capitalization. There are several reasons to believe that higher capitalization 
should foster profitability. First, capital can be considered a cushion to raise the share of risky 
assets, such as loans. When market conditions allow a bank to make additional loans with a 
beneficial return/risk profile, this should imply higher profitability. Second, banks with a high 
franchise value – measured in terms of capitalization – have incentives to remain well 
capitalized and engage in prudent lending. Third, although capital is considered to be the 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 12 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0910 
most expensive bank liability in terms of expected return, holding a relatively large share of 
capital is an important signal of creditworthiness. In fact, when depositors exert market 
discipline, banks with more capital should be able to lower their funding costs.3 Finally, a well 
capitalized bank needs to borrow less in order to support a given level of assets. This can be 
important in emerging countries when the ability to borrow is more subject to sudden stops. 
Berger (1995) and Goddard et al. (2004) provide empirical evidence of the positive relation 
between bank capitalization and profitability for the US and the European banking systems, 
respectively. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) generalize this evidence for 80 industrial and 
emerging countries.  
A related factor is asset quality. Poor asset quality should reduce profitability in as far 
as it limits the bank’s pool of loanable resources. Such a priori is generally confirmed in 
developed countries4 but not always in emerging countries. Brock and Rojas-Suárez (2000), 
for example, show a negative relationship between bank spreads and NPLs over total loans 
for most Latin American banking systems. They argue that this is due to distortions caused by 
inadequate regulation that allow banks to report misstated loan losses. How to account 
appropriately for asset quality is an issue for emerging countries’ banking systems and even 
more so for China.  
Another tangible bank-specific factor is bank efficiency. A more efficient bank should 
be able to make a more effective use of its loanable resources fostering profitability. For 
example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) estimate that 17% of banks’ overhead costs 
are passed on to depositors and lenders while the rest reduces profitability. Bank overhead 
costs, though, are a very rough measure of efficiency. More recently, a more sophisticated 
measure, namely X-efficiency, has come to the forefront. It measures how a particular set of 
prices and quantities of inputs and outputs vary, in accordance with the banks’ chosen 
strategy, and how it impacts bank profitability. Berger (1995) finds that X-efficiency is 
consistently associated with higher profits for a large sample of banks. For the case of China, 
Berger et al. (2009) show that Chinese state-owned banks, in particular SOCBs, are the least 
efficient, and conclude that modernizing them would significantly improve China’s banking 
performance.  
The balance sheet structure of a bank is also bound to affect profitability. 
On the asset side, a larger share of loans to total assets should imply more interest revenue 
because of the higher risk. However, loans also have higher operational costs because they 
need to be originated, serviced and monitored. All in all, profitability should increase with a 
larger share of loans to assets as long as interest rates on loans are liberalized and the bank 
applies mark-up pricing. In this vein, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) report that banks 
with a relatively high share of non-interest earning assets are less profitable. The asset 
structure is also very much influenced by regulation and by administrative controls, which are 
pervasive in China. Fry (1994) shows that administered lending and deposit rates result in 
the misallocation of credit. On the liability side, a larger proportion of deposits should, 
in principle, increase profitability as they constitute a more stable and cheaper funding 
compared to borrowed funds. However, they also require widespread branching and other 
expenses. The latter seems to prevail for a wide sample of developed and emerging banking 
systems [Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999)].  
                                                                          
3. Beyond the evidence for industrial countries, Martínez-Peria and Schmukler (1998) show that depositor market 
discipline exists for some emerging countries (namely Argentina, Chile and Mexico). 
4. See Angbazo (1997) as an example. 
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Bank size is generally considered a relevant determinant of profitability but there no 
consensus on the direction of influence. On the one hand, a bank of a large size should 
reduce costs because of economies of scale or scope. In fact, more diversification 
opportunities should allow to maintain (or even increase) returns while lowering risk. On the 
other hand, large size can also imply that the bank is much harder to manage or it could be 
the consequence of a bank’s aggressive growth strategy. The empirical evidence is also 
mixed. Goddard et al. (2004) and García-Herrero and Vázquez (2007) show that very large 
banks in the industrial countries tend to be more profitable. Stiroh and Rumble (2006), in turn, 
show the downside of size. In the Chinese case, a larger size seems associated with more 
government intervention since the largest banks are the four SOCBs with a large share of 
government ownership and massive intervention.  
As for size, market power may influence profitability, according to two well-known 
theoretical models. The first one is the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis, which 
asserts that a positive relationship between the interest rate margin and concentration 
(a proxy for market power) reflects non-competitive pricing behaviour. The second one is 
the efficient-structure hypothesis, for which a bank’s higher interest margin is attributable 
to more operational efficiency, better management or better production technologies. 
Since these banks will also gain a larger market share (another proxy for market power), the 
structure will become more concentrated due to efficiency gains [Berger (1995)]. The policy 
implications of the two hypotheses go in opposite directions. Under the structure conduct 
theory, high profits stem from market power so that antitrust regulation is welcome to 
allocate resources more efficiently. By contrast, under the efficient-structure hypothesis, 
breaking up efficient banks, or forbidding them to grow, may raise social costs by leading 
to less favourable prices for consumers. The empirical evidence on concentration or 
market share and profitability is mixed. For the Chinese case, Fu and Heffernan (2009) test 
the structure-conduct-performance and the efficient structure hypotheses and find that the 
former fits the Chinese case but only before economic and financial liberalization started, 
that is, before 1992. In other words, at least prior to the reform, very large banks did not 
seem to do any good to the performance of the Chinese banking system. As we shall show 
later, we reach a similar conclusion even in the latest years. 
Another important feature of the profitability is its persistence. Under contestable 
markets, excess profit generated in the market will not persist given that it would attract new 
competitors. In this regard, profits persistence has been related to the existence of barriers 
to competition such as government regulation and or high entry costs and, hence, the 
potential existence of market power [Mueller (1977), Berger et al. (2000), and Goddard 
et al. (2004)]. In the case of China, high governmental intervention and regulations avoiding 
the domestic and foreign entry should result in profit persistence. 
Finally, the macroeconomic environment may also influence bank profitability through 
many different channels. Credit risk, for example, is influenced by economic growth, inflation 
and the level of real interest rates as they affect the borrower’s repayment ability and the value 
of collateral. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) show empirical evidence that rapid 
economic growth and high real interest rates increase profitability for a large number of 
countries. Inflation is generally associated with higher profitability as it implies additional 
earnings from float, which tend to compensate for the higher labour costs [Hanson and 
Rocha (1986), Bourke (1989), and Boyd et al. (2001)]. Higher real interest rates have also 
been found to foster profitability, especially in developing countries [Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (1999)]. This may reflect the fact that demand deposits frequently pay zero or below 
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market rates, even more so in developing countries. In the same vein, interest rate volatility 
generally implies higher interest margins as banks generally manage to transfer the higher risk 
to their clients [Ho and Saunders (1981); Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004)]. 
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3 Stylized facts 
The profitability of Chinese banks5 is low compared to international standards. We conduct a 
quick comparative analysis of the profit and loss account of Chinese banks with those from 
countries having also gone through a transition from a planned economy and a profound 
bank reform, namely Eastern European countries (Table 1). We observe that Chinese banks 
have a lower net interest margin and also a lower operating income, both as a percentage of 
total assets. However, they do have a higher cost to income ratio and a much lower 
pre-provision profit due to massive provisioning and write-offs. 
 
Table 1. International comparison of performance measures 
(in percentage) China Eastern Europe
ROA 0.4 1.8
Net Interest Margin (*) 2.2 5.1
Operating Income(*) 2.6 6.3
Cost to Income (*) 47.2 21.7
Pre-Provision Profit (*) 42.6 60.1
Capital ratio 4.0 11.0
NPL ratio 13.0 2.7
Loan Loss Reserves over total loans 5.5 6.3
(*) Over total assets
Source: Bankscope.
2004
 
 
The above comparison actually hides an important feature of Chinese bank 
profitability, namely its steady improvement in recent years. In fact, the return on average 
assets (ROA) was as low as 0.21 in 1999 but improved to around 0.4 in the last two years for 
which data is available, namely 2003 and 2004 (Chart 1). Such improvement is concentrated 
on SOCBs although their starting level was very low. As we discuss later, this is probably 
related to the transfer of NPLs outside these banks’ balance sheet into asset management 
companies (AMCs). In turn, the ROA of JSCBs has fallen substantially in the last few years, 
albeit from a higher starting level than SOCBs. When taking an alternative measure 
of profitability that excludes provisioning of NPLs, namely pre-provision profit over assets, 
we find a similar trend for SOCBs but a better one for JSCBs. This points to a massive 
provisioning policy for JSCBs.  
Chinese banks generally suffer from poor asset quality. The ratio of NPLs to total 
loans for the banking sector was around 13% in 2004, well above international standards 
(2.7% for Eastern Europe banks in the same year as shown in Table 1 above). Nonetheless, 
the different waves of restructuring carried out by the Chinese government since 1998 have 
reduced the NPL ratio to less than 10% at the end of 2005 from 30% in 1997. In any event, 
asset quality is still a problem, not only because the level of NPLs is still high, but also 
because of the ratio of provisioning to NPLs is well below international standards. In 2004, 
the ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans was less than 5.5%, as compared to 6.3% 
in the Eastern Europe.  
                                                                          
5. Based on consolidated statements. 
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The capitalization of Chinese banks, measured by the capital to assets ratio, is also 
lower than that of Eastern European banks. More specifically, the equity to assets ratio was 
4% in 2004, as compared to 11% for Eastern European banks. Even more worrisome is that 
this ratio has fallen since 1998. The largest fall was concentrated in other commercial banks 
although the starting level was also much higher. JSCBs are the least capitalized group, 
mainly because of their aggressive expansion without additional capital injections. The capital 
to assets ratio of SOCBs also fell somewhat since 1998 and not withstanding the several 
waves of recapitalizations. 
In sum, these stylized facts show that the low profitability which characterises the 
Chinese banking system comes hand in hand with poor asset quality and low capitalization. 
To reach firmer conclusions as to the importance of these factors, we move to the empirical 
section where other potential determinants of profitability will be controlled for. 
 
Chart 1. Stylized facts 
Source: Bankscope
Notes: 1 Weighted by each bank's assests
             2 Weighted by each bank's loans
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4 Methodology 
The main goal of this paper is to test which are the key determinants of the low profitability 
of Chinese banks. Following the literature and taking into account’s China’s particular 
characteristics, we consider bank-specific factors as well as macroeconomic ones.  
We focus on two definitions of profitability: the pre-provision profit and the ROA, 
which subtracts the amount of provisioning from the pre-provision profit. We estimate two 
different models because of the challenges in dealing with NPLs and provisioning data for 
Chinese banks. Not only is the existing data scarce but also not always comparable across 
banks as NPLs are constructed following different loan classification systems. In addition, 
loan loss provisioning is generally used as a proxy of asset quality but this is not possible in 
the Chinese case. In fact, the relation between the flow of NPLs and provisioning is rather 
weak6 since Chinese banks have only recently stepped up their provisioning and, in many 
cases – specially the SOCBs – such provisioning is mandatory and not a consequence of 
banks’ strategies. This is also why provisioning is more correlated with the stock of NPLs than 
the flow.  
When estimating bank profitability, either measured by the ROA or by the 
pre-provision profit, we face a number of challenges. One is endogeneity: as an example, 
more profitable banks may be able to increase their equity more easily by retaining profits. 
They could also pay more for advertising campaigns and increase their size, which in turn 
might affect profitability. However, the causality could also go in the opposite direction, as 
more profitable banks may hire more personnel, reducing their operational efficiency.  
Another important problem is unobservable heterogeneity across banks, which could 
be very large in the Chinese case given differences in corporate governance, which we 
cannot measure well. Finally, the profitability could be very persistent for Chinese banks 
because of political interference. This is particularly the case for state-owned banks, which 
are imposed targets on asset quality and profitability.  
We tackle these three problems together by moving beyond the methodology 
currently in use in this empirical literature of bank profitability (mainly fixed or random effects)7. 
We employ the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) following Arellano and Bover (1995), 
also known as system GMM estimator. This methodology accounts for endogeneity, the 
system GMM estimator uses as instruments lagged values of the dependent variable in levels 
and in differences, as well as lagged values of other regressors which could potentially suffer 
from endogeneity. We instrument for all regressors except for those which are clearly 
exogenous.8 The variables treated as endogenous are shown in italics in the result tables 
below. The system GMM estimator also controls for unobserved heterogeneity and for the 
persistence of the dependent variable. All in all, this estimator yields consistent estimations 
                                                                          
6. The correlation between the stock of loan loss reserves and that of NPLs is 0.43. In turn, the correlation between loan 
loss reserves and the flow of NPLs is negative (see Table A-4 in the appendix). 
7. Recent studies use fixed or random effects, for example, Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004) and Claeys and 
Vander Vennet (2005). Previous ones, such as Angbazo (1997) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) employ 
generalized least squares and weighted least squares, respectively. 
8. In particular, we assume that strictly exogenous variables have no correlation to the individual effects, while the 
endogenous variables are predetermined. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 18 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0910 
of the parameters. The estimated coefficients are also more efficient since an ampler set of 
instruments is considered.  
The last challenge is the risk of omitted variables. To that end, we follow a general to 
specific strategy by estimating an equation with all possible regressors according to the 
exiting literature and China’s specific characteristics. We, then, test – through a Wald test – 
the joint hypothesis that the coefficients of the variables that are not significant individually are 
equal to zero. If not rejected, we re-estimate the model only with the controls which were 
significant in the general regression. Otherwise, we test a less restrictive hypothesis but still 
trying to reduce the number of non-significant regressors to the maximum extent possible. 
We stop reducing the number of regressors when we can reject that the remaining set of 
coefficients of the control variables is equal to zero. The coefficients obtained in this way are 
even more efficient as the number of regressors is reduced to the minimum. 
All in all, and notwithstanding data limitations, the methodology followed – system 
GMM estimator – controls for potential endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity and the 
persistence of the dependent variable, measuring profitability. This methodology should yield 
consistent estimators. In addition, all possible instruments are used and jointly not significant 
regressors are eliminated so as to obtain the most efficient estimators possible.  
We conduct a number of robustness tests. The most important is related to the 
nature of our sample: large N and small T, which does not allow the accurate estimation of 
N-invariant regressors (mainly macroeconomic ones). We, thus, introduce a second model 
where macroeconomic regressors are substituted by time dummies. In addition, in order to 
allow the comparison with other studies on bank profitability, we conduct robustness tests 
with more rudimentary methodologies for panel data, such as fixed effects and OLS. Results 
are relatively similar and are available upon request.9 
                                                                          
9. Such simple models also help account for the fact that a large sample is needed for the properties of the GMM 
estimator to hold asymptotically. 
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5 Variables and data issues  
Our panel is composed of annual data for 87 Chinese banks over the period 1997-2004. 
This accounts for the main universe of Chinese banks holding more than 80% of total assets. 
Since not all banks have information for every year and banks have merged or closed, we opt 
for an unbalanced panel not to lose degrees of freedom. All in all, our sample contains 402 
observations corresponding to a number of banks that varies from a minimum of 38 in 1998 
to a maximum of 68 in 2003.10 It should be noted that the sample used is less than the total 
number of observations in the database because the information has been filtered using two 
criteria: (i) outliers11, and (ii) those observations without data for any of the variables necessary 
for estimating profitability and asset quality have been dropped. Table A-2 in the Appendix 
shows some descriptive statistics and Table A-3 the balance sheet and income statement of 
our sample. 
Bank-specific information was mainly obtained from the Bankscope database 
maintained by Fitch/IBCA/Bureau Van Dijk, which includes income statements and balance 
sheet information according to Chinese accounting standards. For the sake of accuracy, 
we contrasted the data with the original source, the Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking 
for those banks for which data were available (namely 13 out of the 87 in our sample).12  
We use unconsolidated statements whenever possible, although in some cases we 
have to rely on consolidated ones because of data availability.13 Unconsolidated data is 
preferred to avoid relevant differences in profit and loss statements and balance sheets of 
headquarters and subsidiaries compensating each other. All the banks ratios are calculated 
based on the standardised global accounting format used by Bankscope.  
Bank profitability is proxied in many different ways in the empirical literature. 
One is the spreads between the contractual rate charged on loans and that paid on deposits. 
Albeit often used (given its availability for a large sample of countries), it is a very imperfect 
measure of profitability. In fact, it is simply an ex-ante measure which does not take into 
account how the bank is run.  
A second measure is the interest margin (i.e., the difference between banks’ interest 
revenues and their interest expenses). This can be regarded as an ex-post interest rate 
spread. If net, it also controls for the amount of assets each bank has, which gives an idea of 
how efficiently funds are intermediated. For the net interest margin to be a good measure 
of profitability, interest rate revenues and expenses should be closely related to banks’ 
                                                                          
10. Mergers and closures explain that the total number of banks is 87 while the maximum number, within one single 
year, is 68. 
11. We consider as outlier values whose with cumulative frequency is under 1% or above 99% and their deviation from 
the mean is higher than three times the variable’s standard deviation. 
12. The Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking provides the profit and loss statements and balance sheets of SOCBs, 
six JSCBs and the Policy Banks. Besides these banks, Bankscope provides the income statements and balance sheets 
of 4 JSCBs more and a good number of city commercial banks and credit cooperatives. For two JSCBs (Hua Xia Bank 
and China Minsheng Banking Corporation), there are differences between the break down of net income in interest 
income and non interest income but not in the total net income and the remainder items of the income statement and 
balance sheet. Furthermore, 2003 data for the China Construction Bank and the Bank of China include revisions in 
Bankscope but not in the Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking so we have preferred to maintain the most updated 
inversion (i.e., that of Bankscope) 
13. For two SOCBs, Industrial & Commercial Bank of China and Bank of China, we have selected consolidated data 
because the number of NPLs data is higher than in unconsolidated data. 
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behaviour, and not to government decisions. This makes it inappropriate for the Chinese 
case.14 Finally, the (pre-tax) ROA and the return on average equity (ROE) are more 
comprehensive measures of bank profitability as they include operational efficiency and loan 
loss provisioning. We consider the ROA more appropriate than the ROE for the Chinese case, 
as bank equity is abnormally low and it has suffered important artificial changes due to the 
recapitalization programs of the government. In any event, we estimate the same model 
for the ROE and the results are basically maintained.15 In addition to the ROA, we also explore 
the determinants of the pre-provision profit due to ad-hoc provisioning policy that most 
Chinese banks have followed during the last few years. 
As for the regressors, we include the bank-specific and macroeconomic factors 
previously reviewed in the literature section, as well as others related to China’s reform 
process.  
Among the bank-specific factors, corporate governance is as relevant as hard to 
measure, especially in the Chinese case. The lack of information on political intervention and 
government influence obliges us to use indirect measures.16 The first one is the type of bank, 
captured by a dummy. Given the structure of the Chinese banking system, the type of bank 
(SOCBs, Policy Banks, JSCBs, CCBs and TICs) should give some idea of the degree 
of government influence (certainly larger in the first two groups). Other measures related to 
corporate governance could be obtained from the bank’s balance sheet in as far as 
government intervention is reflected in the type of activity that a bank conducts. For example, 
state-owned banks (Policy Banks but also SOCBs) are known to be the major lenders of 
SOEs. Since there is not such a detailed breakdown of individual banks’ balance sheets, 
we have to use rougher measures, related to aggregate lending or deposits. On the asset 
side, we include the rate of growth in lending [loan growth] and the share of loans as a 
percentage of total assets [loans over assets] in as far as the government can control 
the amount of lending through quotas and other means. On the liability side, we take the 
share of deposits to assets [deposits over assets] as a proxy of government intervention in 
as far as government-controlled banks are perceived as safer by depositors. As a robustness 
test, we also include each bank’s Financial Strength rating from Moody’s as a generally proxy 
of a bank’s quality and, thereby, of its management.17  
Second, the stylized facts point to the importance of asset quality which, again, is 
hard to account for accurately, especially in the Chinese case. We consider three alternative 
measures: the flow of NPLs, the stock of NPLs and the ratio of NPLs to total loans18. The first 
should be the preferred proxy in the steady-state; i.e., when the stock of NPLs had been 
reduced to standard levels, which is not yet the case of China. In the Chinese case, though, 
the flow of NPLs has experienced large swings, mainly due to the transfer of NPLs to the 
AMCs19. The stock of NPLs, thus, seems more relevant for our case, together with the ratio 
                                                                          
14. Fu and Heffernan (2009) also make this point.  
15. Results are available upon request. 
16. Proxies, such as the share on loans to SOEs or to local governments are also not publicly available. 
17. Results are available upon request. 
18. In particular, to avoid that NPL ratio be fenced between 0 and 1, we build this alternative measure: 
log[NPL ratio/(1-NPL ratio]). 
19. A robustness test, we analyze the potential determinants of the flow of NPLs and confirms this a-priori since the only 
significant determinants are the recapitalization of banks and the transfer of NPLs to AMCs, i.e., the restructuring 
measures taken under the ongoing reform. 
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of NPLs to total loans, which is the target set out by the Chinese supervisory authorities as 
part of the ongoing reform. We shall, thus, focus on those two.20 
For NPLs, we use problem loans, defined as substandard, doubtful and loss loans 
under the 5-tier classification system and overdue, bad and dead under the old 4-tier 
procedure.21 This is because the Chinese accounting rules used for calculating NPLs differ 
among banks. SOCBs’ NPLs have started following international accounting rules (5-tier loan 
classification system) while other banks are still under the old 4-tier loan classification 
scheme. As a robustness test, we run the regressions only with the observations for which 
there is a homogeneous definition of NPLs and the results are maintained.22 This is the 
only definition available in the Bankscope database for a large enough number of banks. 
In addition, so as to reduce the number of missing observations, we add NPL data from 
Moody’s.23  
We account for bank capitalization in a very rough way, namely as equity over total 
assets [equity over assets] due to the lack of risk-weighted measures for a large number of 
banks. Bank efficiency is measured in terms of X-inefficiency [rank of technical inefficiency]. 
This basically means that the level of cost efficiency of a bank is determined by comparing its 
actual costs to the best-practise minimum costs to produce the same output under the same 
conditions. There are clear advantages in using X-inefficiency, as opposed to more simple 
measures of bank efficiency. A very popular one is the cost to income ratio, which is quite 
distorted in the Chinese as lending and deposit rates are not yet fully liberalized. Another 
popular indicator – the ratio of operating expenses over total assets – is actually a component 
of the ROA, so that including it as a regressor would create identification problems. Among 
the different methodologies to estimate the cost function to measure X-efficiency, we opt for a 
parametric approach based on a translog functional form as in Berger at al. (2009).24,25  
                                                                          
20. The estimated determinants of the flow of NPLs are available upon request. 
21. According to the five-tier classification system a substandard loan is when borrowers' abilities to service their loans 
are in question (borrowers cannot depend on their normal business revenues to pay back the principal and interest so 
losses may ensue, even when guarantees are invoked). Doubtful indicates that borrowers cannot pay back the principal 
and interest in full and significant losses will be incurred, even when guarantees are invoked. Loss means that the 
principal and interest of loans cannot be recovered or only a small portion can be recovered after taking all 
posible measures and resorting to necessary legal procedures. The old four tier classified NPLs into overdue (loans not 
repaid on maturity), bad (loans not repaid one year after maturity) and dead (loans unrecoverable). The major problem 
was that hides many problems of loan quality. For example, the assessment of loan quality according to the time 
of maturity allows borrowers to seek new loans to service old debts, thus turning NPLs into performing loans without 
actually lowering their risks.  
22. Results are available upon request. 
23. In particular, NPLs data for Agricultural Bank of China in 2001 and 2002.  
24. Nonetheless, to avoid a potential bias derived to the inclusion of the X-efficiency measure as a regressor, we treat it 
as endogenous variable. In addition, for robustness, we run the regressions including alternative measures of efficiency: 
cost to income, operating expenses over assets and X-efficiency levels. The main findings hold. 
25. In particular, we estimate the following cost function: 
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where C captures the bank’s total costs. The output (y) variables are total loans, total deposits, liquid assets and other 
earning assets. The two input prices (w) variables are interest expenses to total deposits and non-interest expenses 
to fixed assets. The fixed input (z) is total earning assets. The u term is a factor that represents a bank’s efficiency level 
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Market power is proxied in two ways: first as market share with the usual definition 
(each bank’s total assets over those of the whole banking system [market share on assets]) 
and second, as concentration. For the latter, we opt for the Herfindahl-Hirschman index as it 
takes into account all banks and not only the largest ones. Furthermore, it also considers the 
inequality of market shares. This index is defined as the sum of the squared market shares of 
each bank’s assets for a given year; it is slightly greater than 0 for a perfectly competitive 
market and equals 1 in the case of a monopoly. 
The property structure is accounted for in three ways. We first introduce a different 
dummy for different Chinese banks, namely SOCBs, JSCBs, CCBs, TICs and Policy Banks. 
Second, the increasing role of privatization, and in particular diffused ownership, is assessed 
by including a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when a bank is listed in the stock 
exchange [listed]. We also measure foreign ownership in a way which takes account the 
special characteristics of the Chinese banking system. In fact, while a bank is generally 
considered to be foreign-owned if at least 50% of the capital is in foreigners’ hands, such 
dummy would never have the value of one in the Chinese case, which does not mean that 
foreign ownership cannot have an impact on profitability. We, thus, opt for a dummy which 
takes the value of 1 if there is a foreign participation in the bank’s capital [foreign capital], 
independently of how large it is. The idea behind this is that foreign banks could still exert 
some influence in the way banks are run in as far as the control shareholders and managers 
are interested in learning from their foreign partners and/or give them a stake in the decision 
making process. 
There are a number of institutional aspects specific to the Chinese case, which 
needs to be taken into account. One is the progress made in financial liberalization during the 
last few years. A particularly relevant aspect is the degree of interest rate liberalization. 
We, thus, include a variable that measures the maximum spread between loans and deposit 
rates according to existing regulations [maximum spread]. Other potentially important factor 
associated with the ongoing reform is the amount of NPLs which have been transferred from 
three of the SOCBs to AMCs for their disposal [NPLs dispose of]. Moreover, we include a 
dummy variable [recapitalized], which takes the value of one when a bank receives public 
funds either as capital or to reduce NPLs.  
Finally, the macroeconomic variables considered are the real interest rate on loans, 
real GDP growth and inflation. These are drawn from official sources through the CEIC 
database. 
                                                                                                                                                 
and v is a random error. On the basis of the above formula, we calculate an efficiency rank ordering of each bank in each 
year. Such rank ordering is, then, converted into an ascending scale over [0, 1], where 0 represents the most cost 
efficient bank each year. 
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6 Results 
We investigate empirically which are the determinants of bank profitability in China with annual 
panel data for a maximum of 87 banks during the period 1997 to 2004. We explore two 
complementary measures of bank profitability: pre-provision profits (Table 2) and ROA 
(Table 3). 
The advantages of measuring profitability in terms of pre-provision profit for the 
Chinese case are twofold. First, it limits the problem of the non homogeneous data 
for provisioning across Chinese banks as well as the ad-hoc and government-directed 
provisioning that several large banks have conducted. Second, asset quality is only partially 
accounted for or, at least, to the extent that provisioning is related to asset quality. 
Admittedly, the case of China is less than elsewhere as provisioning is not highly correlated 
with asset quality and, in particular, with NPLs (see Table A-4). 
Exploring the determinants of ROA, though, is still interesting for two reasons: First, 
it is a more comprehensive measure of profitability and, second, it is widely used in the 
literature, which allows comparison with previous studies on China or other countries. 
Given the relevance of poor asset quality in understanding the situation of Chinese 
banks and the scarcity of NPL data – the most often used proxy for asset quality – we carry 
out a preliminary exercise: we estimate the determinants of NPLs for those banks and years 
were data is available and include the significant ones as additional regressors in the equation 
explaining bank profitability.  
We, thus, look for the determinants of NPLs borrowing from the existing literature26 
and China’s special characteristics. We run two different models: one for the ratio of NPLs to 
total loans and another for the stock of NPLs. For each model, we have two specifications: 
one including macroeconomic controls and another with time dummies instead, given our 
sample short time span (left and right columns, respectively). In addition two regressions 
are shown for each specification: one for the full set of regressors (columns 1 and 3) and 
another with the restricted set based on a Wald test of individual and joint insignificance 
(columns 2 and 4). 
The results for the stock and the ratio of NPLs are quite similar (see Table A-5 
and Table A-6). First, low X-efficiency has a positive and significant influence on both 
measures of asset quality. Second, while a larger market share is associated to a higher NPL 
ratio, a higher concentration in the banking system increases the stock of NPLs. Third, listed 
banks (i.e., part of the ownership is private) tend to have a lower stock and NPL ratio. Instead, 
no such evidence can be found for foreign ownership, at least not in the way it is measured 
(through a dummy variable). An obvious result, given the massive transfer of NPLs to 
AMCs, is the significant and negative impact of such transfer on the ratio and the stock 
of NPLs. Finally, the volatility of interest rates contributes to raising the ratio and the stock of 
NPLs, while higher growth is found significant in reducing the ratio of NPLs but not 
necessarily the stock. This seems to indicate that economic growth fosters new lending 
and therefore washes out the asset quality problems, when measured in terms of an 
                                                                          
26. See Salas and Saurina (2002). 
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NPL ratio, as the Chinese authorities’ target. As before, the results are basically maintained 
when introducing time dummies instead of macroeconomic variables. 
We now move to estimating the pre-provision profit and the ROA but introducing, as 
additional regressors, the determinants of NPLs, which we were significant in the previous 
regressions. The results are shown in Table 2 below and follow the same structure as before 
(one specification with macroeconomic controls and one with time dummies instead and, for 
each, one with the full set of regressors and another with the restricted set).  
Starting with the pre-provision profit, a higher equity to assets ratio is found 
significant in increasing the pre-provision profit in all model specifications. This result is similar 
to others found for emerging economies since the degree of bank capitalization may be a 
concern for investors or depositors. A larger share of deposits to assets also seems to boost 
the pre-provision profit. This is consistent with the idea that deposits in China are the 
cheapest liability from the bank’s perspective, especially in a context of not fully liberalized 
interest rates. It this context, it is interesting to note that government-controlled banks are 
also those with a higher deposit to asset ratio, as one would expect given their implicit 
government guarantee. Another expected result is that X-inefficiency lowers the pre-provision 
profit in a statistically significant way.  
An interesting result is found for bank concentration. A more concentrated banking 
system is associated with a lower pre-provision profit. In the Chinese case, the degree of 
concentration is very much related to the weight of the four SOCBs in the banking system so 
that a reduction of their share in the total bank assets seems to bode well for profitability. 
Interestingly, this result is true beyond the massive provisioning policies that these banks have 
been conducting. This is not the first paper which finds such a negative impact of Chinese 
largest banks (i.e., the SOCBs) on overall bank performance as we reviewed in the Section 2.  
Another result pointing to the importance of government intervention in determining 
bank profitability – through the ownership structure and/or corporate governance – is the 
negative and significant dummy for Policy Banks. A mirror finding is the positive and 
significant coefficient for the dummies representing JSCBs and, to some extent, the TICs 
although this is now a highly heterogeneous group.27 Finally, the fact that a bank is listed 
or whether it has foreign ownership does not seem to matter for the pre-provision profit.28 
There may other reasons for these results, other than the irrelevance of private/foreign 
ownership: one is that the dummies distinguishing across types of bank, as well as other 
balance sheet characteristics may have already captured that information. The other is that 
the way in which private and foreign ownership is measured – through a dummy 
independently on the degree of private/foreign ownership – may not be accurate enough. 
In this line, García-Herrero and Santabárbara (2008) use more precise measures of foreign 
ownership (such as the actual percentage over total capital) and find that foreign ownership 
does foster profitability. 
Another finding is the persistence of the pre-provision profits, marked by the very 
significant and also large coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. As pointed, the existing 
literature considers the persistence of profitability as a signal of barriers to competition 
                                                                          
27. The very positive finding for TICs may be influenced by sample selection in as far as only large TICs are included in 
the Bankscope database. 
28. It should also be noted that potential reverse causality between profitability and the ownership structure is accounted 
for since both variables (listed and foreign capital) are instrumented under the GMM estimation.  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 25 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0910 
(the more so if the parameter approaches one). Our estimated parameter is statistically 
different from one but still quite large. Apart from the lack of competition, the persistence of 
the pre-provision profit could again reflect a high degree of government intervention. This is 
because banks are given yearly targets for asset quality and capitalization so that they cannot 
really change their business models, even if opportunities arise. 
Finally, from the macroeconomic variables included, higher real interest rates on 
loans and inflation appear to foster profitability while the volatility of interest rates reduces it. 
The latter results, however, should be treated with great care given the very small number 
of informative observations to estimate macroeconomic variables. The findings for the 
bank-specific variables, however, are not influenced by the inclusion of such macroeconomic 
variables, as they are maintained in the regressions with time dummies. 
 
Table 2. Results for pre-provision profit over assets 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: 
log Pre-Provision Profit over Assets
Jointly non-
significant
Jointly non-
significant
Loan growth -0.312* -0.253* -0.331** -0.255*
(0.060) (0.078) (0.049) (0.092)
Log Loans over Assets 0.046 0.046
(0.622) (0.612)
Log Deposits over Assets 0.086 0.110** 0.080 0.103**
(0.138) (0.029) (0.177) (0.039)
Log Equity over Assets 0.190 0.186* 0.198* 0.197**
(0.115) (0.071) (0.097) (0.037)
Rank Technical Inefficiency -0.432** -0.721*** -0.411** -0.704***
(0.039) (0.001) (0.037) (0.001)
Foreign Capital -0.094 -0.123
(0.475) (0.367)
Listed 0.093 0.101
(0.505) (0.478)
Recapitalized -0.215 -0.170
(0.417) (0.502)
Market Share on Assets -3.688 -3.531
(0.299) (0.306)
Concentration (Herfindahl index) -6.250 -4.774***
(0.114) (0.003)
Real Interest on Loans 18.503** 20.177**
(0.045) (0.028)
Maximum Spread -8.536
(0.432)
Real GDP Growth -7.129
(0.662)
Inflation 18.584* 16.886*
(0.050) (0.066)
Volatility of Interest Rates -0.122*** -0.095**
(0.008) (0.012)
SOCBs 0.645 0.626
(0.308) (0.298)
JSCBs 0.234 0.156** 0.251 0.161**
(0.324) (0.036) (0.280) (0.030)
TICs 0.327* 0.396** 0.297 0.364**
(0.098) (0.020) (0.152) (0.040)
CCBs 0.061 0.074
(0.774) (0.722)
Policy Banks -0.562* -0.777*** -0.529* -0.761***
(0.094) (0.002) (0.087) (0.002)
Lag log Pre-Provision Profit over Assets 0.478*** 0.398*** 0.500*** 0.411***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003)
Constant -0.926 -2.452** -0.993* -1.308*
(0.723) (0.018) (0.096) (0.051)
Observations 218 218 218 218
Number of groups 56 56 56 56
Hansen test (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.995)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences (0.734) (0.852) (0.707) (0.994)
Robust p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Variables in italics are instrumented through the GMM procedure following Arellano and Bover (1995)
(1) Year dummies not reported
Macroeconomic approach Yearly Dummies approach (1)
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We now investigate the determinants of the ROA. The results are very similar 
to those found for the pre-provision profit (Table 3). Banks with higher equity to assets and a 
relatively larger share of deposits tend to have a higher ROA. In turn, bank inefficiency and 
a higher market share tend to reduce the ROA. As before, JSCBs and TICs tend to have a 
higher ROA. The opposite is true for Policy Banks. As for the pre-provision profit, the ROA is 
found to be persistent and higher real interest rates and inflation tend to raise the ROA while 
the volatility of interest rates reduces it. 
 
Table 3. Results for pre-tax ROA 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: 
log pre-tax ROA
Jointly non-
significant
Jointly non-
significant
Loan Growth -0.406** -0.357* -0.397* -0.371*
(0.046) (0.075) (0.055) (0.076)
Log Loans over Assets 0.095 0.084
(0.380) (0.415)
Log Deposits over Assets 0.154** 0.155*** 0.152** 0.164***
(0.013) (0.005) (0.015) (0.003)
Log Equity over Assets 0.226** 0.234** 0.227** 0.256***
(0.031) (0.026) (0.023) (0.007)
Rank Technical Inefficiency -0.424** -0.548** -0.387* -0.406**
(0.049) (0.026) (0.060) (0.015)
Foreign Capital 0.023 0.000
(0.845) (0.999)
Listed 0.059 0.049
(0.748) (0.786)
Recapitalized 0.212 0.250
(0.205) (0.138)
Market Share on Assets -7.943** -2.987** -7.958** -2.899**
(0.038) (0.032) (0.038) (0.032)
Concentration (Herfindahl index) -0.733
(0.846)
Real Interest on Loans 18.398* 15.868**
(0.064) (0.038)
Maximum Spread -0.583
(0.964)
Real GDP Growth 3.370
(0.852)
Inflation 17.791* 17.373**
(0.068) (0.033)
Volatility of Interest Rates -0.094* -0.061*
(0.051) (0.061)
SOCBs 0.935 0.956
(0.159) (0.142)
JSCBs 0.154 0.189 0.194**
(0.554) (0.465) (0.026)
TICs 0.546** 0.455** 0.540** 0.476**
(0.024) (0.033) (0.029) (0.018)
CCBs -0.089 -0.068
(0.684) (0.762)
Policy Banks -0.414 -0.548*** -0.378 -0.454***
(0.244) (0.003) (0.269) (0.009)
Lag log Pretax ROA 0.378*** 0.358*** 0.384*** 0.340***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant -3.305 -3.048*** -1.353** -1.570**
(0.257) (0.006) (0.034) (0.017)
Observations 216 216 216 216
Number of groups 56 56 56 56
Hansen test (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences (0.174) (0.188) (0.167) (0.208)
Robust p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Variables in italics are instrumented through the GMM procedure following Arellano and Bover (1995)
(1) Year dummies not reported
Macroeconomic approach Yearly Dummies approach (1)
 
 
Finally, as a robustness check, we include the ratio of NPLs directly in the equation 
explaining the ROA. While the number of observations is considerably reduced, some of our 
findings hold. In particular, better capitalized banks are more profitable, and profitability is 
still very persistent. Inflation and too high and volatile interest rates also reduce the ROA 
(see Table A-7). 
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7 Conclusions 
In the context of the ongoing bank reform in China, this paper analyzes empirically what 
are the main determinants of profitability for Chinese banks. We use a panel data set for 87 
banks from 1997 to 2004. We measure profitability in two ways: the pre-provision profit and 
the ROA.  
Given the scarcity and drawbacks of NPL data – a potentially important determinant 
of profitability –, we carry out a preliminary exercise. Namely, we estimate the determinants of 
NPLs for those banks and years for which data is available and include the significant ones as 
additional regressors in the equation explaining bank profitability. In particular, low X-efficiency 
of banks, a big market share, higher concentration are all associated with more NPLs. Listed 
banks, in turn, tend to have better asset quality. Finally, low economic growth and high and 
volatile interest rates are associated with more NPLs.  
We then, estimate the determinants of profitability and find a number of results which 
are quite robust across different definitions of profitability (the pre-provision profit or the ROA) 
and specifications. Better capitalized banks tend to be more profitable. The same is true for 
banks with a relatively larger share of deposits and for more X-efficient banks. An interesting 
finding is that a less concentrated banking system increases bank profitability, which basically 
reflects that SOCBs have been the main drag for system’s profitability. The negative and 
significant coefficient of the dummy for Policy Banks puts them in the same side as SOCBs, 
suggesting that government intervention does not bode well for profitability. Another piece of 
evidence in the same direction is the positive and significant coefficient for the dummies 
representing JSCBs and TICs. From the macroeconomic variables included, higher real 
interest rates on loans and inflation appear to foster profitability while the volatility of interest 
rates reduces it.  
Finally, profitability seems to be quite persistent in China, which probably signals 
barriers to competition but also a high degree of government intervention as banks are given 
yearly targets for asset quality and capitalization. This again shows how much profitability is 
influenced by government decisions.  
These findings should not come as a surprise for a banking system which has long 
been functioning as a mechanism for transferring huge savings to meet public policy goals. 
In fact, the government’s development strategy has implied using the banking system to keep 
inefficient SOEs afloat among other public goals such as massive infrastructure investment. 
The ongoing reform will need to ensure that government intervention in the banking system is 
reduced by lowering the share of government ownership, improving the corporate culture and 
fully liberalizing the financial system. This is especially relevant as profitability will be more 
sought after as Chinese banks become more market-oriented and face stronger competition. 
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Appendix 
Table A - 1. Data sources 
Variable Definition Type Units Source
ROA Return on average assets before taxes Bank Specific Ratio Bankscope
ROE Return on average equity before taxes Bank Specific Ratio Bankscope
Pre-Provision Profit over 
Assets
Operating income minus operating expenses over assets Bank Specific Ratio Bankscope
NPL ratio Problem loans over total loans Bank Specific Ratio Bankscope
Stock of NPLs Stock of problem loans Bank Specific CNY Millions Bankscope
Flow of NPLs Flow of problem loans (as difference of stocks) Bank Specific CNY Millions Bankscope
Loans Total loans Bank Specific CNY Millions Bankscope
Loan Growth Total loans, annual growth rate Bank Specific Bankscope
Loans over Assets Total loans over total assets Bank Specific Ratio Bankscope
Deposits over Assets Total deposits over assets Bank Specific Ratio Bankscope
Equity over Assets Value of equity over total assets Bank Specific Ratio Bankscope
Rank Technical Inefficiency Rank of technical inefficiency in uniform scale over [0,1] (0 best-1 
worst)
Bank Specific Index
Foreign Capital 1 if a bank has foreign ownership at the end of the year; 0 
otherwise
Bank Specific Dummy García-Herrero et 
al. (2006)
Listed 1 if a bank has been listed at the end of the year; 0 otherwise Bank Specific Dummy García-Herrero et 
al. (2006)
Recapitalized 1 if a bank has been recapitalized by the government; 0 otherwise Bank Specific Dummy García-Herrero et 
al. (2006)
NPLs Dispose of NPLs transferred to AMCs Bank Specific CNY Millions García-Herrero et 
al. (2006)
Financial Strength Rating Financial Strength Rating (1 worst-12 best) Bank Specific Index Moody's
Market Share on Assets Each bank total assets over banking system total assets Bank Specific Ratio Bankscope, CEIC
Concentration (Herfindahl 
index)
Sum of the squared market shares of each bank assets Macroeconomic Index Bankscope
Real GDP Growth Real GDP, annual growth rate Macroeconomic CEIC
Inflation CPI annual inflation rate Macroeconomic CEIC
Real Interest on Loans One year real reference interest rate on loans Macroeconomic CEIC
Maximum Spread between 
Loan and Deposit rates
Maximum spread between interest rate on loans and interest rate 
on deposits
Macroeconomic CEIC, García-
Herrero et al. 
(2006)
Volatility of Interest Rates Standard deviation of monthly average of interbank offered interest 
rate (7 day)
Macroeconomic CEIC
System Credit Growth Banking system credit growth Macroeconomic CEIC  
Table A - 2. Descriptive statistics 
Name Obs. Mean
Sd. 
Deviation Min Perc. 1% Perc. 99% Max
ROA 368 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.07
ROE 368 0.09 0.08 -0.20 -0.07 0.37 0.50
Pre-Provision Profit over Assets 368 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.06 0.11
NPL ratio 200 0.20 0.37 0.00 0.00 2.38 3.66
Stock of NPLs 200 54729 167259 0.4 0.5 776398 831725
Flow of NPLs 152 -5374 30528 -242198.5 -195917.2 24399 26078
Loans 371 213042 546346 1.2 1.7 2688877 3705274
Loan Growth 308 0.33 1.89 -0.98 -0.55 2.60 32.54
Loans over Assets 371 0.50 0.18 0.00 0.01 0.96 0.98
Deposits over Assets 359 0.73 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.95 0.97
Equity over Assets 371 0.13 0.19 0.01 0.01 0.96 0.98
Rank technical inefficiency 268 0.50 0.30 0 0 1 1
Foreign Capital 371 0.05 0.23 0 0 1 1
Listed 371 0.06 0.25 0 0 1 1
Recapitalized 371 0.01 0.12 0 0 1 1
NPLs Dispose of 371 4512 37786 0 0 267400 407700
Financial Strength Rating 131 2.89 1.21 1 1 5 5
Market Share on Assets 371 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.26
Concentration (Herfindahl index) 371 0.14 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.17 0.17
Real Interest on Loans 371 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.08
Maximum Spread between Loan and Deposit rates 371 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.07
Real GDP Growth 371 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.10
Inflation 371 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.04
Volatility of Interest Rates 371 0.44 0.48 0.07 0.07 1.53 1.53
System Credit Growth 371 0.15 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.23 0.23  
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Table A - 3. Balance Sheet and Income Statement 
CNY bn 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Assets
Loans 5729 6410 6855 9827 10100 11800 13900 14400
Other Earning Assets 2687 2962 3526 5693 5982 6821 7819 8349
Total Earning Assets 8416 9372 10382 15519 16082 18621 21719 22749
Total Assets 9041 10200 11200 16800 17300 19600 22800 23600
Liabilities & Equity
Deposits & Short term Funding 7546 8341 9089 14000 14400 17400 20000 20900
Other Funding 506 633 767 881 958 189 202 291
Other (Non Interest bearing) 551 551 720 922 953 903 1447 1446
Total Liabilities 8603 9525 10576 15803 16311 18492 21649 22638
Equity 410 610 636 922 881 858 979 893
CNY bn 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Net Interest Revenue 172 186 188 287 301 335 419 476
Other Operating Income 61 50 44 53 60 86 98 69
Total Operating Income 233 236 232 340 361 421 518 544
Total Operating Expenses 133 152 144 196 197 254 291 274
Pre-provision Profit 100 83 87 144 163 167 226 271
Loan Loss Provisions 19 25 31 58 85 83 87 110
Profit before Taxes 81 59 56 85 78 84 139 161
Taxes 42 36 35 50 41 40 59 67
Net Income 40 22 21 36 38 44 81 94
Number of banks 40 38 41 46 41 53 68 53
BALANCE SHEET
INCOME STATEMENT
 
 Table A - 4. NPLs cross correlation 
Loan Loss 
Reserve 
(Stock)
Loan 
Provisons 
(Flow) Flow of NPLs
Flow of NPLs 
(-1)
Stock of 
NPLs
Stock of 
NPLs (-1)
Loan Loss Reserve (Stock) 1
Loan Provisons (Flow) 0.49 1
Flow of NPLs -0.47 -0.44 1
Flow of NPLs (-1) -0.33 -0.41 0.20 1
Stock of NPLs 0.43 0.81 -0.26 -0.31 1
Stock of NPLs (-1) 0.49 0.84 -0.42 -0.33 0.99 1  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 32 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0910 
Table A - 5. Results for NPL ratio  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: 
log (NPL ratio/1-NPL ratio)
Jointly non-
significant
Jointly non-
significant
-0.211 -0.194
(0.234) (0.296)
Log Loans over Assets -0.018 -0.043
(0.974) (0.939)
0.177 0.177
(0.324) (0.327)
Rank technical inefficiency 0.264 0.688** 0.307 0.526
(0.425) (0.027) (0.350) (0.138)
Foreign Capital 0.053 0.043
(0.730) (0.781)
Listed -0.305 -0.554** -0.302 -0.580**
(0.101) (0.010) (0.109) (0.015)
Recapitalized -0.682* -0.642* -0.711* -0.673*
(0.095) (0.089) (0.085) (0.072)
Log NPLs Dispose of -0.049*** -0.047*** -0.051*** -0.056***
(0.007) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002)
Market Share on Assets 3.487 1.864*** 3.023 2.166***
(0.192) (0.007) (0.249) (0.001)
1.757
(0.742)
Real Interest on Loans -2.255
(0.864)
Maximum spread 6.178
(0.719)
Real GDP Growth -13.864 -27.383***
(0.565) (0.000)
Inflation -3.137
(0.838)
Volatility of Interest Rates 0.143* 0.119***
(0.052) (0.003)
-0.130 -0.056
(0.799) (0.912)
JSCBs 0.157 0.171
(0.395) (0.365)
TICs 0.893** 0.230 0.916** 0.220
(0.048) (0.759) (0.047) (0.779)
Lag log (NPL ratio/1-NPL ratio) 0.694*** 0.638*** 0.700*** 0.657***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.503 1.290*** -0.212 -0.616
(0.888) (0.000) (0.806) (0.150)
Observations 115 144 115 144
Number of groups 32 41 32 41
Hansen test (1.000) (0.995) (1.000) (0.997)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences (0.048) (0.009) (0.047) (0.030)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences (0.038) (0.066) (0.036) (0.046)
Robust p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Variables in italics are instrumented through the GMM procedure following Arellano and Bover (1995)
(1) Year dummies not reported
Yearly Dummies approach (1)
Log Equity over Assets (-1)
SOCBs
Loan Growth (-1)
Concentration (Herfindahl Index)
Macroeconomic approach
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Table A - 6 Results for Stock of NPLs 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: 
log Stock of NPLs
Jointly non-
significant
Jointly non-
significant
0.310** 0.344*** 0.309** 0.360***
(0.021) (0.000) (0.022) (0.001)
Loan Growth -0.078 -0.079
(0.770) (0.768)
Loan Growth (-1) -0.154 -0.151
(0.345) (0.357)
Log Loans over Assets 0.285 0.266
(0.523) (0.548)
Log Equity over Assets (-1) 0.212 0.218
(0.173) (0.170)
Rank Technical Inefficiency 0.241 0.545* 0.261 0.597**
(0.382) (0.062) (0.356) (0.044)
Foreign Capital 0.029 0.022
(0.806) (0.854)
Listed -0.216 -0.380* -0.206 -0.390*
(0.111) (0.073) (0.124) (0.051)
Recapitalized -0.616 -0.726 -0.635 -0.685
(0.115) (0.102) (0.112) (0.123)
-0.044*** -0.052*** -0.045*** -0.055***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Market Share on Assets 0.818 0.698
(0.742) (0.776)
Concentration (Herfindahl index) 5.070 7.564*** 147.001
(0.151) (0.000) (0.116)
Real Interest on Loans -17.866*
(0.092)
Volatility of Interest Rates 0.114* 0.090***
(0.080) (0.005)
Inflation -19.256
(0.105)
Real GDP Growth -4.963
(0.734)
System Credit Growth -0.813
(0.409)
SOCBs -0.002 0.032
(0.997) (0.947)
JSCBs 0.100 0.108
(0.534) (0.505)
TICs 0.522 -0.144 0.517 -0.137
(0.177) (0.803) (0.189) (0.813)
Lag log Stock of NPLs 0.709*** 0.707*** 0.708*** 0.693***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.974 -2.229*** 0.053 -26.285*
(0.546) (0.001) (0.948) (0.096)
Observations 115 144 115 144
Number of groups 32 41 32 41
Hansen test (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (0.996)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences (0.021) (0.009) (0.020) (0.013)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences (0.384) (0.138) (0.396) (0.124)
Robust p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Variables in italics are instrumented through the GMM procedure following Arellano and Bover (1995)
(1) Year dummies not reported
Log Loans
Log NPLs Dispose of
Macroeconomic approach Yearly Dummies approach (1)
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Table A - 7 Results for ROA (Including NPLs) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: 
log pre-tax ROA
Jointly non-
significant
Jointly non-
significant
Loan Growth -0.228** -0.166 -0.227** -0.220*
(0.031) (0.134) (0.045) (0.072)
Log Loans over Assets -0.204 -0.099 -0.214 -0.109
(0.189) (0.537) (0.152) (0.543)
Log Deposits over Assets -0.082 -0.086
(0.233) (0.209)
Log Equity over Assets 0.047 0.156* 0.049 0.188**
(0.654) (0.051) (0.610) (0.047)
Log Non-Performing loans over assets -0.081 -0.054 -0.083 -0.080*
(0.140) (0.199) (0.125) (0.064)
Rank technical inefficiency 0.005 0.008
(0.975) (0.953)
Foreign Capital 0.021 0.014
(0.826) (0.886)
Listed 0.125 0.118
(0.216) (0.193)
Recapitalized 1.072*** 1.059*** 1.057*** 1.015***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Market Share on Assets -3.557* -4.693** -3.642* -5.959**
(0.074) (0.045) (0.074) (0.028)
Concentration (Herfindahl index) -2.123
(0.566)
Real Interest on Loans 15.755 15.795**
(0.110) (0.016)
Maximum spread -13.519
(0.199)
Real GDP Growth -14.829
(0.423)
Inflation 23.436** 16.144**
(0.016) (0.019)
Volatility of Interest Rates -0.126*** -0.092***
(0.000) (0.005)
SOCBs 0.430 0.549 0.446 0.828*
(0.167) (0.112) (0.164) (0.050)
JSCBs 0.022 0.032 0.131
(0.802) (0.684) (0.120)
TICs -0.006 -0.028
(0.985) (0.933)
Lag log Pretax ROA 0.614*** 0.612*** 0.606*** 0.607***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -1.044 -2.652*** -1.464** -1.526***
(0.667) (0.002) (0.014) (0.000)
Observations 152 164 152 164
Number of groups 41 47 41 47
Hansen test (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) (0.011)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences (0.602) (0.799) (0.593) (0.836)
Robust p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Variables in italics are instrumented through the GMM procedure following Arellano and Bover (1995)
(1) Year dummies not reported
Macroeconomic approach Yearly Dummies approach (1)
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Table A -8. Cross correlation matrix
Log Pre-tax ROA Log Pre-tax ROE
Log Pre-Provision 
Profit over Assets Log NPL ratio Log NPL Flow of NPLs Loan Growth Log Loans Loan Growth (-1)
Log Loans over 
Assets
Log Deposits over 
Assets
Log Equity over 
Assets
Log Equity over 
Assets (-1)
Rank Technical 
Inefficiency Foreign Capital Listed Recapitalized
Log NPLs Dispose 
of
Market Share on 
Assets Concentration
Real Interest on 
Loans Maximum Spread Real GDP Growth Inflation
Volatility of Interest 
Rates
Log Pre-tax ROA 1
Log Pre-tax ROE 0,36 1
Log Pre-Provision Profit over Assets 0,88 0,38 1
Log NPL ratio -0,19 -0,35 -0,21 1
Log NPL -0,19 0,16 0,01 0,30 1
Flow of NPLs 0,00 0,02 -0,06 -0,01 -0,28 1
Loan Growth 0,08 -0,06 0,09 -0,17 0,01 0,17 1
Log Loans -0,32 0,38 -0,19 -0,09 0,92 -0,29 -0,07 1
Loan Growth (-1) -0,02 0,14 0,07 -0,31 -0,08 0,16 0,33 0,08 1
Log Loans over Assets -0,33 0,28 -0,25 -0,24 0,36 -0,02 -0,03 0,53 0,24 1
Log Deposits over Assets -0,07 0,40 -0,01 -0,08 0,16 -0,04 0,04 0,22 0,08 0,32 1
Log Equity over Assets 0,52 -0,60 0,38 0,15 -0,37 -0,04 0,12 -0,61 -0,17 -0,53 -0,45 1
Log Equity over Assets (-1) 0,47 -0,61 0,35 0,16 -0,34 0,01 0,14 -0,60 -0,14 -0,48 -0,42 0,94 1
Rank Technical Inefficiency -0,12 -0,42 -0,20 0,52 0,06 -0,15 -0,07 -0,20 -0,10 -0,05 -0,11 0,32 0,40 1
Foreign Capital 0,01 0,16 0,07 -0,13 0,08 0,08 0,01 0,14 0,11 0,06 0,08 -0,14 -0,13 -0,08 1
Listed 0,05 0,24 0,12 -0,20 0,11 0,08 0,02 0,18 0,20 0,11 0,09 -0,18 -0,20 -0,26 0,18 1
Recapitalized -0,04 0,02 -0,03 -0,01 0,16 -0,48 -0,01 0,18 -0,02 0,05 0,05 -0,03 -0,09 0,06 -0,03 -0,03 1
Log NPLs Dispose of -0,04 0,01 -0,01 0,04 0,24 -0,66 -0,02 0,20 -0,05 0,04 0,05 -0,04 -0,04 0,07 -0,03 -0,03 -0,01 1
Market Share on Assets -0,24 0,00 -0,10 0,23 0,67 -0,50 -0,04 0,55 -0,10 0,17 0,10 -0,20 -0,21 0,09 -0,05 -0,05 0,36 0,42 1
Concentration 0,14 0,08 0,04 0,26 0,22 0,08 -0,08 0,09 -0,10 0,19 0,05 0,03 0,16 0,00 -0,10 -0,08 0,02 0,01 0,07 1
Real Interest on Loans 0,08 0,07 0,01 0,20 0,13 0,11 -0,09 0,08 -0,03 0,19 0,07 -0,01 0,08 0,00 -0,08 -0,08 0,07 -0,05 0,04 0,81 1
Maximum Spread -0,16 -0,12 -0,11 -0,11 -0,07 -0,08 0,08 -0,04 0,00 -0,12 -0,05 -0,03 -0,02 0,00 0,06 0,08 -0,11 0,10 -0,03 -0,66 -0,87 1
Real GDP Growth 0,06 0,03 0,12 -0,27 -0,22 -0,12 0,08 -0,11 0,05 -0,20 -0,07 0,05 -0,10 0,00 0,06 0,05 0,00 -0,01 -0,06 -0,80 -0,74 0,37 1
Inflation 0,18 0,06 0,19 -0,21 -0,14 -0,10 0,10 -0,08 0,01 -0,15 -0,11 0,12 0,05 0,00 0,04 0,03 -0,06 0,03 -0,03 -0,49 -0,77 0,49 0,77 1
Volatility of Interest Rates 0,24 0,06 0,17 0,01 -0,05 0,07 -0,05 -0,02 0,03 0,03 -0,02 0,15 0,13 0,00 -0,06 -0,08 0,12 -0,08 0,00 0,45 0,67 -0,76 -0,26 -0,29 1
System Credit Growth 0,11 0,14 0,15 -0,16 -0,14 0,01 0,00 -0,05 0,13 -0,06 0,00 -0,01 -0,16 0,00 0,04 -0,02 0,07 -0,15 -0,04 -0,25 0,03 -0,46 0,52 0,22 0,34
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